Going To Venezuela A Policy Patchwork

The Consequences of the Action in Venezuela are unknown at this point. The purpose here is to look at several factors unique to the Trump Administration that likely went into the decision.

In the coming days and weeks, we will learn a good deal more about the Trump administration’s reasoning, its expectations, and what follow-on steps it will be taking. It will likely come out piecemeal, and it would be reasonable to anticipate that there will be some administration obfuscation, dishonesty, and dodging of unpleasant realities in the manner in which the administration manages its public comment. But in the immediate aftermath, there are several aspects for us to identify, all of them evidence of Trump’s political DNA, the style we have all come to recognize and that reveals his narcissism, the supremacy of clout and the sweep of jurisdiction he so adores, and his love of worldwide attention his actions will earn him personally. All of them, listed below, most likely figure in one way or another into why the US did what it did the night of January 2-3. Let’s look at them, one by one.

First, and perhaps foremost, it was an expression of power in its purest form. Trump did not consult any of the eight senior members of the congressional leadership as custom and tradition require, even though he could have done so under the most secretive of conditions to ensure there would be no leaks. It was Trump’s bespoke version of an earlier anti-narcotics operation against Panama’s Manuel Noriega under the George HW Bush administration, an effort to put his own stamp on the notion of hemispheric domination. Venezuela is, however, a much, much bigger fish than Panama, and harder to land. A midnight snatch of Maduro and his wife would overshadow the two dozen attacks on cigarette boats and the lack of focus that appeared to temporarily limit the cohesion of the Southern Command, by the operation’s sheer boldness and swift, successful execution. Trump is saying to the legislative branch that they do not matter in the arena of national security, that he as the commander-in-chief, is indeed implementing the unitary presidency and is therefore the ultimate “decider,” to use the George W. Bush terminology.

Second, it was a prologue as a brash, physical manifestation of the new National Security Strategy that Trump announced in November 2025, that declared the Western Hemisphere an American sphere of influence, never to be contested by Russia or China. The invasion of Venezuela and the abduction of its president is an unarguable statement of immediate and incontrovertible impact to every leader in the region (as well as to Moscow and Beijing) that the US means what it says.

Third, as distractions meant to sideline the administration’s Epstein files problem, there is nothing equal to the public horsepower of an invasion of a foreign country. At least for a while, Venezuela has scrubbed the globe’s front pages of Epstein, but the durability of that issue will worm its way back into the public eye before long. That, of course, is the essential weakness of distractions, that by their very nature they are only

temporary. It is not likely that distraction was a principal motivator here, more likely a secondary effect, but very useful nonetheless.

Fourth, the Venezuela operation has the unmistakable fingerprints of Secretary of State Rubio, who has had it in for Maduro for a long time. It appears that Rubio was of singular value in support of the move and that other senior cabinet officers whose portfolios all have some interest have not, at least so far, been seen popping champagne corks. Whether part of Trump’s thinking or not, the circumstances of Rubio’s role will probably advance him a rung or two up the ladder for 2028 and the anticipated competition with VP Vance.

The Venezuela operation was a superb example of our American air, ground, conventional, and special operations capabilities, covert intelligence capabilities, and the exceptional effectiveness of joint operations among our several branches. (Some of you may recall, if you are as old as I am, how difficult it was to achieve real jointness after the ill-fated “Operation Eagle Claw” attempt in 1980 to rescue American hostages in Iran failed so spectacularly.) This attack itself, and the seizure of Maduro and his wife from their beds in the middle of the night, is the dramatic stuff of movies and books, skills unparalleled elsewhere. That we can launch that kind of an operation without significant losses is something in my view all Americans should be proud of — the tactical brilliance of the day.

But the American people are keenly aware of how events turned sour in Iraq and Afghanistan following initially successful military operations, and will unfailingly be tuned in to the kind of unintended consequences that are certain to be part and parcel of this one.

Of particular concern is the unwarranted, imperious self-assuredness of the president in stating that the US “will run things in Venezuela until a suitable transition can be arranged.” Those words further erode what little confidence there might be that the president actually understands the perils that lie ahead or that he has the political know-how to deal with them.

Bill Piekney served 4 years in the US Navy, 30 years with the CIA retiring as a Senior Operations Executive, and 5 years as a Senior Consultant at ODNI, International Consultant in Intelligence and National Security. He is a member of The Steady State.

Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 360 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.