Trump: Big Talker, Pitiful Leader – What Has He Achieved?
The Economist, March 21, 2026: “Operation Blind Fury”
Donald Trump’s campaign against Iran has cost lives, cash, and credibility, achieved almost nothing strategic, deepened global chaos and mistrust, and exposed a presidency that reflexively prefers spectacle over a sober plan.
During five weeks of war with Iran, the President of the United States and his acolytes have showered us with words, often contradictory or nonsensical, to persuade us not to trust our eyes and our judgment that his war is not going well. According to polls, this tactic is backfiring, with Congressional Democrats finally finding their footing in opposition, and even normally noisy loyalists voicing doubt and criticism. Meanwhile, Trump’s bombastic threats to create even more havoc, worries of a world thrown into economic chaos, and galloping gasoline prices here at home have swept us up in an increasingly anxious wave.
It’s worth taking a moment to remember how little information we had to go on in the days leading up to the February 28 Israeli-American attack. In a February 25 Steady State post, I listed some of the pertinent questions to ask about U.S. intentions. Rereading this list, it is shocking, but not surprising, how many of these questions remain unanswered or have been obscured by the Administration’s confusing and often absurd rhetoric.
Here are some excerpts.
“Once again (after the Venezuela operation), the President of the United States is contemplating the use of American military might overseas and has prepared an enormous force for attack, this time on Iran. And yet once again, despite the seriousness of doing so, he has not consulted Congress, explained to the American people why such a step might be in the American national interest, or made any effort to solicit support from either. These facts alone demonstrate Presidential malpractice and endanger Americans – at home, living and working in the Middle East, and in uniform – as well as citizens of the region.
“It is perhaps understandable that Trump and his people see a particular opportunity to break the regime’s grip on the country. Trump’s record demonstrates that he favors brief, splashy actions to achieve his objectives, with the hard work of planning to deal with the consequences saved for later. The idea seems to be, in typical Trumpian fashion, to cow the Iranians into submitting to American demands to abandon uranium enrichment, send any remaining stocks overseas, abandon its missile programs, and cut off all support to its proxies in the region.
“Does Trump think that air power and missile attacks will frighten the Iranians into “capitulation”? Does he think that force will be the last straw that breaks a weakened regime’s back? Does he think that air power alone can eliminate both the clerics and the powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (which itself possesses great political, military, and economic power)? If so, whom, if anyone, does he foresee capable of assuming power in Iran? What kind of Iran emerges from such turmoil?
“Crucially, how long does Trump think force would continue to be necessary in order to bring about any of these still undefined objectives? What does Trump think the risks to the U.S. and to American lives (including Americans already in the region, or forces in combat) of what is likely to be an open-ended effort might be? Has anyone planned how to minimize or counter those risks? In short, what is the goal? And what is the price likely to be?”
To Trump’s great frustration and even puzzlement, the Iranians did not cave in. (At various times, his threats have also included a promise never to “permit” Iran to have a nuclear weapon and to destroy the Iranian regime to allow the country’s popular opposition to seize power.) That left him with only two tools: negotiation and the use of force. How serious the U.S. negotiation effort was can be debated, but the U.S. side, while making its maximum demands public, never had a good grasp of what Iran might have been persuaded to do. How serious Iran was, we do not know, but it persuasively argued that it was merely being handed an ultimatum, rather than any prospect of compromise. That the February 28 attack was launched while the Iranians, the Omani mediators, and others still expected the talks to continue merely hardened Iran’s suspicions. Trump again has been frustrated and puzzled that despite enormous physical damage to Iran, and the loss of hundreds of its senior officials, using force has not worked either.
So what has Trump achieved, after billions of dollars, thirteen American deaths, hundreds more wounded, a number of destroyed American aircraft, nearly 2000 dead Iranians, damage in friendly regional states (including civilian deaths in Israel, the other attacker), and shipping in one of the world’s most crucial waterways brought to a halt with no near-term prospect for an end to the fighting?
Shockingly, but also not surprisingly, very little. Iran was not close to developing a nuclear weapon and is now presumably farther away, but there is absolutely no reason to suppose that its successor leaders, in their rage and isolation, will be willing to give up any such aspiration. Iran retains its stocks of enriched uranium, which are presumably mostly still buried after last June’s Israeli-American raids, but they are beyond U.S. grasp unless it is willing to undertake a very risky and probably foolhardy mission to retrieve them. There is probably little left of the Iranian capacity for further enrichment, but without outside monitoring, it would not be hard for Iran to rebuild such a capability. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ grip on the country remains in place. While Iran’s missile and drone stocks have been badly depleted, it can still wreak painful damage on its targets. And there is no reason to suppose – except possibly that Iran might physically find it harder to do, now that its willingness to support proxy forces in the area has decreased. Trump’s erstwhile promise given to brave Iranians on the streets – “Help is on the way” – evaporated weeks ago.
American allies have only become more mistrustful of the United States. The U.S. military has moved personnel away from vulnerable bases, hoping to make them safer by housing them in local offices and hotels. While this motive may be laudable, it is hard to distinguish this action from using civilians as human shields, a war crime and something the U.S. has always regarded as repugnant. Trump has only mentioned shifting timelines and expiring deadlines to indicate how long hostilities might last. And he has never leveled with the American people about what price – in money and lives – he intends that we should continue to pay.
Before February 28, the Strait of Hormuz was open, and there was no threat to its closure. Through U.S. blundering, the Strait is closed; reopening it has evolved into a principal war aim. Yet even that goal remains elusive and would be difficult and dangerous to accomplish. We now hear news of possible new negotiations and exchanges of demands; given, however, the even wider conceptual gulf than before between the antagonists and other pertinent obstacles, it is unlikely that any such efforts will produce much in the short term. It is always conceivable that the Iranians could decide to sue for peace, or Trump could pick a moment to declare victory and walk away, but there is good reason to be skeptical here as well.
It is hard to know whether Trump and his circle of yes-men have grasped the obvious seriousness and enormous costs of their strategic blundering. But every time Trump opens his mouth to crow about American greatness, he provides instead more proof of how he has weakened the United States.
Tom Wolfson is a former senior U.S. diplomat who has lived and worked in six foreign countries, occasionally multiple times. His work representing the U.S. has included assignments at the United Nations, in the U.S. Congress, and with an international democracy-building organization. He is a member of The Steady State.
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 400 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law and the preservation of America’s national security.
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