Failure to Adhere to the Just War Theory Threatens to Turn Epic Resolve into an Epic Failure

(Photo by Adam Hornyak on Unsplash)

Fog of war is an issue in every conflict, but when one or both sides ignore the Just War Theory, that fog is denser.

Much has been said and written about Epic Resolve, the US-Israeli aerial bombardment of Iran, focusing on its shifting goals, legality, and similar issues. On a more fundamental level, however, considering that there is still a possibility Donald Trump may order the deployment of American ground forces to Iran—an action likely to result in higher casualties on all sides—the morality of this operation should also be examined. At that point, it would be foolish not to call the operation what it truly is—a war.

While the actions thus far in Epic Resolve pale in comparison to our actions against Native Americans from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the Administration’s actions are still called into question under the Just War Theory, which traces its roots back to classical Roman and biblical traditions. This theory addresses the right to go to war (jus ad bellum), the right conduct in war (jus in bello), and justice after war (jus post bellum). At its core, the Just War Theory rests on the fundamental premise that, while war is inherently destructive and should be avoided, there are circumstances in which conflict becomes not just permissible but morally necessary. As unpleasant as it is to contemplate, Epic Resolve appears to fall short in a number of the first two areas, jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

Legitimate authority. Only properly established authorities have the power to declare war. Although the US Congress has nearly relinquished its constitutional right to do so, the Constitution remains unchanged, leaving the question of the president’s legal authority to lead the country into war unresolved.

Right intention. The purpose of war must align with just cause, not conquest or economic gain. Regime change is conquest, pure and simple.

Probability of success. There must be a reasonable chance of achieving the war’s objectives. While the war’s goals vary depending on who is speaking, regime change has been the main focus, but no clear plan to accomplish it has been proposed. Additionally, actions by both the US and Israel—mainly Israel—through targeted killings of regime officials, make regime change nearly impossible without a large-scale, long-term deployment of ground forces.

Last resort. All non-violent options, such as diplomacy or sanctions, must be tried first. Although negotiations were not successful, they had not been ended, and even if the Iranians were stalling for time, considering the turbulent history between the US and Iran, and the lack of experienced experts during the three negotiation sessions, expecting progress was unreasonable. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Trump withdrew from during his first term, took nearly two years to finalize and involved nuclear experts. It’s very unlikely that inexperienced negotiators like Kushner and Witkoff could reach any agreement in the limited time they had.

Discrimination. Combatants must distinguish between military targets and civilians. While details are still sketchy, the destruction of a school, killing over 100 students, is questionable at best. Although targeting heads of state is not common, it is rare in modern conflict, and according to the US Department of Defense Law of War Manual (5.7.4), which, by the way, is no longer accessible on the DOD website, attacks on a national leadership of an enemy state have often been avoided to promote comity and ensure that authorities exist with whom peace agreements may be made. The targeted killing of Iran’s supreme leader and most of his high-ranking staff certainly complicates any future ceasefire or peace agreement. Additionally, traditionally, the only legal bases under the law of armed conflict for targeting national leaders are their possible combatant status or their direct participation in hostilities.

Trump’s insistence on Iran’s ‘unconditional surrender’ is another red line and a cause for concern.

Unconditional surrender is defined as capitulation without guarantees or negotiated terms. While a demand for unconditional surrender may act as a sufficient deterrent against aggressors or a diplomatic tool to induce a weak enemy to seek peace, it can also provoke a more protracted war, since it gives the opponent no incentive to surrender. Unconditional surrender leads to uncertainty, and uncertainty generates fear, which can provoke a harder and longer campaign than would otherwise be necessary to vanquish an opponent. In simpler terms, the demand for unconditional surrender, notwithstanding the superiority of American and Israeli airpower, will have to be enforced by boots on the ground, raising the specter of another Middle Eastern ‘forever war.’ During World War II, the Allies demanded unconditional surrender from Germany and Japan. A controversial approach, even at the time, it was justified on the grounds that Allied occupation would not violate the rights of enemy civilians, and it was aimed at preventing further conflict. It shouldn’t be lost on anyone, though, that it took two atomic bombs dropped on Japan to force its surrender, which itself was considered morally indefensible by many. Iran’s president, Masoud Pexeshkian, has already rejected the demand in blunt terms, further raising the specter of a prolonged quagmire.

In fairness, whether a demand for unconditional surrender contravenes just war theory depends on intent, implementation, and consequences. At this point, we don’t know the intent and can’t even guess the implementation or consequences. It remains, however, a concern.

Whether we talk about Epic Resolve or Wounded Knee, we are forced to admit that there have been periods in American history when the norms of what we could call civilized behavior were flagrantly ignored. The lesson is that when we normalize the flouting of norms, we undermine trust and sabotage opportunities to negotiate lasting peace. In the nineteenth century, a massacre of 150 innocents was a root cause of another ten years of war, and even though peace was finally restored on the Western frontier, it can be legitimately argued that trust between Native Americans and the US Government has not been restored over a century later. Iran, with a population of some 93 million people in an area one-sixth the size of the United States, or the combined area of the states of Texas, California, and Montana, will not be a cakewalk for US ground forces, whether they involve small special operations forces or larger conventional forces.

Before a decision is made to commit ground forces to Iran, we should have answers to the following questions:

The questions to ask before any such operation is launched would be:

1. What strategic national interests require a ground invasion of Iran?

2. What is the desired end state?

3. What are the projections in time, resources, and losses to achieve the desired end state?

4. Is the end state worth the cost?

If satisfactory answers can’t be obtained to these questions, ground operations should not even be considered. Instead, we should ask ourselves whether we’re risking history repeating itself in this region, with the potential for even more serious consequences than in the past.

Charles A. Ray served 20 years in the U.S. Army, including two tours in Vietnam. He retired as a senior US diplomat, serving 30 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, with assignments as ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe, and was the first American consul general in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. He also served in senior positions with the Department of Defense and is a member of The Steady State.

Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.