“Well Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?” “A republic…if you can keep it.” ~ Benjamin Franklin, to Elizabeth Willing Powel after the 1787 Constitutional Convention.
America is celebrating 250 years of democracy in 2026 while ironically facing what may be its most serious existential challenge ever. This quarter millennium milestone should be cause for rejoicing for the blessings of liberty, justice, prosperity, and peace conferred on us by America’s brilliant experiment in self-governance.
Instead, we observe daily outrageous acts by the Administration that ignore plain language Constitutional protections, the rule of law, and traditional democratic norms. Public sentiment is widely ignored. Masked immigration agents randomly and brutally pull immigrants and citizens from streets, cars, homes, and workplaces without probable cause or due process. Our military attacks a sovereign nation and kidnaps its leader without provocation or Congressional approval. Deadly military attacks on civilian foreign nationals take place on the high seas with no proof of criminal act, intent, or national security threat. The President openly sells influence to billionaires and extorts million-dollar “gifts” from foreign nations. The list of unconstitutional and unlawful acts proliferates. This is not how our democracy, or any democracy, is supposed to operate. How in the world did we get here? More importantly, how do we save our constitutional republic and preserve it for future generations?
The Declaration of Independence asserted the American Colonies’ right to separate from England and enumerated its grievances against a tyrannical Monarch. It articulated core human inalienable rights of life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, equality, and government by consent. These core values were based upon the social compact, an Enlightenment ideal by which the people give their consent to be governed (i.e., to abide by the laws) in exchange for the government protecting their inalienable rights and operating within its limited scope of activity, as articulated in the Preamble to the Constitution in 1787.
“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”
Since its original ratification in 1788, the Constitution has served as the supreme law of the United States, enumerating the structure, functions, and limits of Federal authority. Since 1884, all elected, appointed, and military and civilian members of the Federal Government take an oath to the Constitution, not to a President or a political faction, swearing to “support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” The three coequal branches of government are clearly not behaving as our forefathers intended and as our Constitution requires.
So how can this grievously broken social compact be saved and fulfill the Framers’ dream that we keep our republic of laws in perpetuity? Constitutional guardrails have largely failed and institutions have been sorely weakened under the brazen overreach of the current Administration. When the government attempts to pick winners, suppress competition, undermine truth, or protect secretly favored interests, it undermines the very mechanisms that serve justice and generate prosperity. When it provides public “goods,” adheres to and enforces laws, and finances itself with transparency and equity, it strengthens them. Unfortunately, we are living through a perfect storm of government corruption, brutality, and perfidy, infecting, in different degrees, all three coequal branches.
Leadership of the executive departments and agencies is ignoring their oaths and carrying out the President’s self-aggrandizing, erratic, and often unlawful urges. The Supreme Court is often failing to limit the overreach of the Executive, even when it transgresses the plain meaning of the Constitution or when the Court finds it necessary to make up new privileges that undermine equal justice under law (e.g., Presidential presumptive immunity for all “official” acts. Trump v. U.S. 2024). The Congress, too, has failed to serve as a restraint on the Executive, deferring and acquiescing to unethical, corrupt, and unlawful acts of the Administration.
Can we keep our Republic by saving it from autocratic takeover? Of course we must! There is no other acceptable outcome for freedom-loving people. Thus, it falls to all of us to determine whether America enters its next half-century under an authoritarian Caudillo or as the democratic Constitutional Republic generations of Americans have fought and died for. We each have a responsibility as citizens to ferret out truth from propaganda, to understand the existential threats our democracy faces, and to engage, individually and en masse, to make our grievances visible to our elected officials. That responsibility includes:
– informing ourselves by seeking out and using information sources widely trusted for veracity,
– engaging in respectful, lively discourse via blogs, chat rooms, letters to the editor, and official communications with our elected representatives,
– joining and participating in organized affinity groups,
– understanding and exercising our constitutional rights, gathering to peacefully demonstrate on issues of concern, and
– voting for those who commit to restoring the rule of law and Constitutional norms and against those who are failing to uphold their oath to protect and defend the Constitution.
The American People must meet this existential challenge NOW at this critical moment in our history. And, if we are fortunate enough to succeed in preserving our democracy, we must institutionalize through our education system the crucial lesson of citizen-engaged participation in countering the constant threats to our precious Constitution-based civic and political culture.
Douglas Clapp, Captain USCG (Ret.) is a member of The Steady State. His career service in Maritime Safety & Security culminated as Deputy Director of the Coast Guard’s Training & Education System, Reserve Component, and Leadership/Diversity functions. In is post-military career, he served as Senior Analyst for the Operations Directorate, USNORTHCOM as a missions expert in Defense of the Homeland and Military Assistance to Civil Authorities for emergencies and disasters.
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
https://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.png00sienahttps://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.pngsiena2026-03-03 18:08:552026-03-03 18:08:55DEMOCRACY. CAN WE KEEP IT?
Though bruised and battered and in a state of exhaustion and semi-shock, we have survived the first year of Trump 2.0, so now we only have to make it for three more years. If this first year is anything to go by, though, by January 2029, when Donald Trump, as he did in 2021 when Joe Biden was inaugurated, slinks out of the White House and avoids the ceremony, we’ll be living in a democracy that is even more tattered, but—and I’m being extremely optimistic here—essentially intact democracy.
But, even if the mid-term elections in November deliver us a new congressional majority that is able to circumvent the majority of Trump’s norm-busting activities and keep us from being blindly led into a major armed conflict as he flexes his muscle around the globe like a twenty-first century Atilla the Hun, we will be in the tree line, not out of the woods. Restoring normalcy and rebuilding a fully functioning democratic society, and by this I don’t mean rebuild what was, but rebuild better (more on that later), is not something that will be accomplished during the course of one four-year presidential administration, nor even two or three, for that matter. We must prepare ourselves for a multi-generational rebuilding project, not just to undo the harm that’s been done, but ot build stronger guardrails to forestall an encore of Trump 1.0 and 2.0.
At this point, one has to ask. Do we think we’re up to it? When Donald Trump turns over the keys to a radically altered White House to his successor and flies off to Mar-a-Lago, will his shadow still linger over Washington like the Grim Reaper, blocking the sunlight of a brighter future? Can the political process, where one party has surrendered itself to the dictates of a cult of personality that has emboldened nativism, exclusion, and authoritarianism for four years, dismantling or undermining many of the institutions that form the bedrock of a functioning democracy, ever reform itself? Can We the People commit ourselves to the decades of hard work that will be required to remake the society that our Founding Fathers envisioned, dedicated to forming a ‘more perfect’ union?
The answer to the first question is a qualified yes, depending on the answer to the second: if we’re unable to commit to the second, we won’t be able to achieve the first.
Building back better, after eight years of MAGA mutilation and manipulation, will be a generational task requiring a period of stabilization and rebuilding to restore governing institutions to a basic level of functionality, so we can begin the process of restoring people’s faith in the government and outreach to allies to restore our international reputation. While much of the responsibility for initiating this rebirth will fall on the newly installed executive branch, the essential foundation of this effort will be what is often referred to these days as the Exhausted Majority, the majority of Americans who have become so tired of being ignored and not having their needs met that they’ve basically checked out. It will be absolutely necessary to reengage them, from the older ones who just want a peaceful retirement to the children just starting kindergarten. Through a program of civic education, managed by a revitalized Department of Education with citizen input, children must be taught to understand, communicate, and cooperate as citizens in a diverse society, and adults must be encouraged to actively participate in all levels of governing, from the local PTA or neighborhood watch to engaging with national leaders on issues that affect us all.
Brick by brick, position by position, the new executive branch must begin the process of restoring hollowed-out institutions, enabling them to provide the necessary services to the citizens of this country. At the same time, procedures must be put in place to insulate the government service, the Civil Service, the Foreign Service, and the military and security services from politicization.
Even more important, every one of us must be clear-eyed about the fact that this will be a generational effort, and it will require firm commitment from us to stay the course. Rome wasn’t built in a day, and American democracy will not be restored by a single election. Let us take heart from the American patriot, author of Common Sense, Thomas Paine, whose writings framed the argument for independence from Great Britain, who wrote, “The harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.” The way ahead of us will be long and hard, and the journey will not end, but it’s the journey, not the destination that’s important.
“These are the times that try men’s souls,” Paine also wrote. Today, we should replace ‘men’s’ with ‘people’s’, but the message is just as apt today as it was in 1775. As tiring as it might be, we must make the effort.
Charles A. Ray served 20 years in the U.S. Army, including two tours in Vietnam. He retired as a senior US diplomat, serving 30 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, with assignments as ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe, and was the first American consul general in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. He also served in senior positions with the Department of Defense and is a member of The Steady State.
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
https://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.png00sienahttps://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.pngsiena2026-03-03 15:02:552026-03-03 15:02:55America After Trump: The Exhausted Majority’s Mission is to Build Back Better.
Former CIA deputy director Michael Morell joins former senior CIA operations officers and to reflect on post 9/11 overcorrection towards counterterrorism. They assess the current “might makes right” approach to foreign policy and weigh the arguments for and against efforts for regime change in Iran.
Mr. Morell also explores how we can strengthen U.S. intelligence, public trust, and future decision-making in an era of great power competition and complex global threats.
This episode was recorded 12 hours before the U.S. launched attacks against Iran.
https://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.png00sienahttps://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.pngsiena2026-03-03 06:05:062026-03-03 06:05:06Might Makes Right? Michael Morell on U.S. Power, Allies, and Adversaries
Former CIA deputy director Michael Morell joins former senior CIA operations officers Jim Lawler and John Sipher to reflect on post 9/11 overcorrection towards counterterrorism. They assess the current “might makes right” approach to foreign policy, and weigh the arguments for and against efforts for regime change in Iran.
Mr. Morell also explores how we can strengthen U.S. intelligence, public trust, and future decision-making in an era of great power competition and complex global threats.
This episode was recorded 12 hours before the US launched attacks against Iran.
Jim Lawler (0:1.273) Hello, you’re listening to the Steady State Sentinel from the Steady State. I’m Jim Lawler, a former senior CIA operations officer. And joining me as my co-host today is John Seifer, my friend and another former senior CIA officer. Today, we’re talking with Michael Morell. Michael was the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 2010 to 2013, and twice he was acting director of the CIA. His book, The Great War of Our Time, the CIA’s fight against terrorism, was a New York Times bestseller, and it traces his three-long, three-decade-long career at the CIA. Michael, welcome to our program. You’ve been involved in vital national security issues now for about three decades. How is our current national security posture different today than in previous years when you were active in government?
Buckeye (0:54.691) So Jim, John, it’s great to be with you guys. ⁓ Couldn’t think of a better way to spend the afternoon than ⁓ talking with both of you. ⁓ We have two ops officers here and we have an analyst, right? So there’s gotta be a joke in there somewhere, but you guys are better at making up jokes than I, so I’ll let you do that. ⁓ But.
John Sipher (1:2.138) You ⁓
John Sipher (1:8.998) .
Jim Lawler (1:12.933) Well, my joke, Michael, is whenever an analyst comes into a room full of DO officers, the average IQ goes up about 30 points.
John Sipher (1:12.972) We’ll try to be ⁓ easy on you.
Buckeye (1:21.179) ⁓ But the analyst is always looking at their shoes while they’re talking to you. ⁓ I do want to tell one story because it ⁓ puts me in context. And Jim, you mentioned that I was acting director twice. So when I was acting director the second time between Dave Petraeus and John Brennan, ⁓ my wife and I went out to dinner ⁓ in Arlington. ⁓ And the difference between a director’s security package, Is the director gets two cars and four agents and a deputy director only gets one car and two agents, probably because they’re deemed less important. ⁓ But that day we had ⁓ two armored cars and four agents and we pull into this parking lot and there is this guy standing against the wall and he’s looking at us and you can tell by the look on his face that he’s thinking like, who is this, right? Is this Michelle Obama? Is this Secretary of State? Like, who is this? So he’s on my wife’s side of the car. And when my wife gets out, he says to her, ⁓ is that somebody important? And my lovely wife says, no, he’s just acting important. ⁓ She could be an ops officer.
John Sipher (2:30.478) ⁓ well played.
Jim Lawler (2:30.606) Hahaha!
Jim Lawler (2:34.885) Good one.
John Sipher (2:36.844) Yeah, yeah, she can. So let me let me ask you a question and we’ll get back to sort of that general thing is, I mean, you were center stage as well when we entered what eventually became called the war on terror. Right. And so ⁓ how do you see that the ⁓ I see and how it’s adapting to challenges now? Did we stay focused on terrorism for too long? And then alternatively, have we overcompensated from counterterrorism to this great power competition stuff they seem to focused on today?
Buckeye (3:5.083) So it’s a great question. I’ll caveat it by saying I really have no idea what’s going on ⁓ inside. ⁓ So really important caveat. Look, I ⁓ think in retrospect, the country ⁓ and the intelligence community, ⁓ no surprise, given what happened to us on 9-11, overreacted. ⁓
John Sipher (3:12.706) Neither do we, so don’t worry about it.
Buckeye (3:33.539) you know, the pendulum swung too far. So while we were successfully post 9-11 focusing on Al-Qaeda, and I don’t think, ⁓ I think CIA’s performance on Al-Qaeda post 9-11 was perhaps ⁓ its single greatest sustained performance on anything at any time in its history. So I’m gonna give us a ton of credit, right? We ⁓ brought all those people who were involved in 9-11 ⁓ to justice, and we brought Bin Laden to justice, and we prevented attacks on the United States. ⁓ And you guys know as well as I do how many they were planning in that post-9-11 period. So great success. But ⁓ did we in the country, ⁓ we by moving so many resources to terrorism, to counterterrorism, and the country moving so many resources to the military, the long sustained campaign in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq period, right? Did we swing too far? And I think there’s an argument ⁓ that the answer to that question is yes. And I think it cost us because during that 20 year period, right, certainly 10, 15 years for sure, I don’t know what happened after I left, but during that 15 year period, we weren’t focused as much as I thought we should have been on Russia. We weren’t as focused as much as I thought we should have been on China. ⁓ And I think ⁓ that left us not in as good a position vis-a-vis those adversaries as we should have been as an agency. So I think there is an argument to that. Did we shift too much away? I don’t know because I’m not there. But it does seem to me that if you’re going to track the most significant threats facing the nation right now, ⁓ there was a significant shift that was necessary, right, from counterterrorism to two nation states, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea.
Jim Lawler (5:36.901) ⁓ Looking, Michael, at our current national security posture, do you think we are actually safer today than we were on 9-11 because of current administration policies and IC leadership? Or is it simply that we’ve inherited a lot of the strong foundations that you and other officers put down for us? What’s your thoughts on this?
Buckeye (5:59.237) So let me offer, let me say something about where I think we are ⁓ as a country with regard to foreign policy and ⁓ maybe ⁓ why we’re there ⁓ and ⁓ maybe a little bit about how this evolves. ⁓ So, ⁓ my strong sense, you guys probably see it too, my strong sense is that we to some extent have joined our adversaries in what is a might makes right world, right? That we are ⁓ threatening countries ⁓ to get what we want, ⁓ either militarily, in the case of Venezuela, or economically, in the case of tariffs on pretty much everybody, that we’re kind of acting like these adversaries that we’ve not thought very highly of for a very long time, right? This is the way they act. ⁓ You know, why are we there? Is it just the president’s approach to things or is there something deeper? ⁓ And I think that there’s probably two ways that the U.S. can approach the world at this moment. ⁓ know, we can’t be the single hegemon in the world, right? We simply don’t have the relative power that we had when we did that. Right. ⁓ The strength of China, right, is the The emergence of China as a great power, right, is the most important reason for that. know, we can’t be that global hegemon all by ourselves. We simply don’t have the resources. China is strong. ⁓ And ⁓ we simply can’t do that. So you really, seems to me, we have two choices. One choice is ⁓ to pull together the biggest group of allies and partners that we can and work with them. to sustain to the extent we can some sort of global international order that was somewhat, at least somewhat similar to what we had before. Where we’re acting certainly in our own interests, but we’re also acting in the broader interests of our allies and partners, right? That’s one way we could do this. That’s what President Biden focused on. ⁓ That was exactly how he was gonna approach these difficult problems in the world. And he…
Buckeye (8:23.351) You know, he built a lot of things, right? He built the Quad in East Asia to try to stand up to China a bit. But you could also argue that You can also argue that ⁓ it didn’t work very well, that the US didn’t seem to have ⁓ as much power as it needed to have to ⁓ push back on adversaries or even allies. So the best example is Ukraine, right? Biden ⁓ did a lot. He felt constrained a little bit by ⁓ Putin’s… ⁓ Maybe more than a little bit. He felt constrained by Putin’s escalation rhetoric, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons. ⁓ But ⁓ he, you he couldn’t prevent the Russian attack on Ukraine ⁓ and he couldn’t dislodge Russia from Ukraine. Right. ⁓ Perhaps Ronald Reagan would have taken a different approach. ⁓ Maybe not. ⁓ You know, President Reagan was deeply concerned about nuclear war as as ⁓ as President Biden was. So who knows? But. ⁓ He wasn’t able to resolve that, right? He helped Ukraine stand on its own two feet and fight ⁓ and push back the Russians and all that’s really good, but he didn’t dislodge them. ⁓ And then on Gaza with an ally is, you know, he was incredibly supportive of Israel in the aftermath of October 7th, as he should have been in my view. ⁓ But when he wanted Netanyahu to ease up in Gaza, he completely failed. He was not able to do that, right? Netanyahu did what he wanted. ⁓ So this allies and partners thing, you know, really didn’t deliver. ⁓ So I think probably our current approach is rooted in the philosophy, maybe not philosophy, but ⁓ in the mindset ⁓ and personality of our president. But it’s really the alternative to the allies and partners approach. ⁓ I don’t think it’s going to work.
Buckeye (10:31.283) any better and I think arguably it’s going to work a lot worse. ⁓ That we’re going to be ⁓ in worse shape in the world than we would have in the allies-partners approach. ⁓ But we’ll see how this plays out and I think people are going to start comparing these things. ⁓ One of the implications ⁓ of the ⁓ might-make-right approach is that it forces ⁓ Russia China and the United States into spheres of influence. Because where your ⁓ might matters most is in your neighborhood. So that’s where you’re going to focus the might makes right approach. ⁓ And it seems to me that the US ⁓ is slipping into this ⁓ might makes rights approach in ⁓ the Western hemisphere. ⁓ We risk China doing the same in East Asia in a very significant way, I think. And we risk letting Putin do that right in his backyard or neighborhood, whatever you want to call it. ⁓ So I think the spheres of influence thing ⁓ is a real possibility. And we seem to be heading in that direction. And spheres of influence, as you guys know, ⁓ seem stable until the spheres of influence bump up against each other. And then they’re not so stable. This is World War kind of stuff. So ⁓ I think that’s where we are. I don’t think it’s particularly helpful, but I understand it to some degree.
John Sipher (11:54.028) Right.
John Sipher (12:3.470) I mean, your insights like this are really very useful and you’ve written a lot of op-ed pieces. You’ve written a book. You had an excellent podcast series. So let me ask you a question that that Jim and all of us have to sort of deal with since we spent a career in a secret intelligence agency. How should people like us, how should intelligence agencies that operate largely in secrecy maintain public trust? How should people like us, former intelligence officers, engage publicly without undermining the sort of apolitical norms of their profession?
Buckeye (12:31.450) Yeah.
John Sipher (12:33.516) or finding ourselves being sort of like played around with by politicians who just create their own narratives based on what they want us to have said.
Buckeye (12:41.807) Yeah, so it’s a great question. And you guys know that there are a number of our former colleagues who think that we shouldn’t even be doing this, ⁓ that once you leave CIA, you shouldn’t speak.
John Sipher (12:57.240) But many of them say that when they’re in, then when they come out, they do the same damn thing. ⁓
Buckeye (12:58.939) ⁓ No, here’s the other thing. ⁓ Many of them on the outside are doing the same thing while they’re telling us not to speak. ⁓ That’s the best part, right? ⁓ And many of them who are saying to us, don’t be political, are being political when they’re saying, don’t be political. So I don’t have any time for those people. ⁓ But ⁓ I always thought, ⁓ and I think one of our really
John Sipher (13:7.561) Exactly. Yeah.
Buckeye (13:27.685) great directors, Mike Hayden felt the same way, that we keep the fence line of what we’re willing to talk about too close in. That there is a lot of room to push that fence line out. There is a lot of things that we can talk about, stories we can tell, ⁓ successes that we can talk about, failures that we should talk about, right? ⁓ And you can still protect… classified information that you need to protect by pushing that fence line out. In fact, you actually strengthen your ability to protect that classified information because ⁓ all the reporters out there are focusing on the things you’re talking about, right? They’re not focusing on the things you’re not talking about. So ⁓ I’ve always thought there’s room for the agency itself and the intelligence community itself to push the fence line out and talk more about what we do to the American people and not let somebody else do it on our behalf because nobody’s going to do it as well as we do. ⁓ The second thing I’d say is, ⁓ obviously, you know, when I left the government, I wrote a book, ⁓ I worked for CBS News, ⁓ I had a podcast, I was out there talking all the time. ⁓ And ⁓ I think that’s just as important for former senior officials to do, because we do live in a democracy. The American people do have a right to know as much as we can possibly share with them. And when you’re a senior official like all three of us, ⁓ we know where the lines are. ⁓ We know what we can say here and what we can’t. We know what’s been declassified and what hasn’t, right? So ⁓ I think we’re part ⁓ of the system for helping the American people understand what intelligence is, ⁓ why we do it as a nation, ⁓ how we approach it as ethically as we possibly can, ⁓ talk about our successes. and why they’re successes and talk about our failures and why they failed and what we’re doing to make sure it never happens again. I think it’s incredibly valuable.
John Sipher (15:30.446) ⁓ that’s awful.
Jim Lawler (15:33.303) Michael, if you were currently in power as either director of CIA or a major policymaker, and my question may be a little overtaken by events very quickly, but what should we be doing vis-a-vis Iran? Should we be just a cheerleader on the sidelines or how should we encourage these people to throw off the mullahs ⁓ and ⁓ perhaps pursue their own ⁓ democracy or whatever system they choose?
Buckeye (16:3.551) We’re in a pretty delicate moment ⁓ as of this taping ⁓ with Iran. ⁓ It’s quite possible before the podcast comes out that we could be at war. ⁓ But I think… I think Iran is a very complex ⁓ problem. ⁓ It’s not easy. It’s wickedly hard. I think it’s fair to say, and I’ve heard Prime Minister Netanyahu say this, that the United States ⁓ and ⁓ Israel pummeled the Iranian nuclear program and we didn’t destroy it. And there is no way the Iranians are going to negotiate on missiles because it ⁓ is their only defense, particularly now that the proxies have been weakened. So there’s no way they’re going to give up missiles, put limits on missiles. They’re just not going to do that. And those missiles are aimed right at Israel. ⁓ And there’s no way they’re going to stop dealing with the proxies, even if they promise not to. We know how covert action works. It works the same way. You can deny it. You can deny it till the ends of the earth come home. So they’re not going to do that either. So the argument of those who are in favor of war ⁓ is Iran’s going to keep being Iran, the Iran we don’t like, until the regime is gone. And we’re never going to have a better chance than we have right now to get rid of this regime. This is the argument of those people who are saying we should go. ⁓ And it’s true ⁓ that we’ve probably never been in a better position to change the regime than we are now. Iran is weaker militarily than it’s been in a very, very long time as a result of the war last June. And Iran is weaker politically.
Buckeye (18:4.475) the regime is weaker politically than it’s probably been at any point in its history. So now’s a good time. And if you’re Prime Minister Netanyahu, you’re never gonna have a better partner in the White House, right? And if you’re Prime Minister Netanyahu, you got an election that you have to call by October, right? And if you can go to the voters and say, defeated Hamas, I defeated Hezbollah, and I defeated the head of the snake, I have brought us permanent security. You can see him saying this, right? ⁓ I brought us permanent security. ⁓
John Sipher (18:35.502) Mm-hmm. Thank
Buckeye (18:41.247) you know, he might win, right, which is kind of astonishing, you know, given October 7th and all the failures, you know, surrounding October 7th. ⁓ So that’s the reasons, right, to go. ⁓ The reasons not to go are, number one, there is no guarantee that either ⁓ a significant sustained military campaign is going to dislodge the regime. In fact, the probability is less than 50 % that only an air campaign can dislodge the regime. So there’s no guarantee that this military action, even a significant one, is actually going to accomplish what you’re trying to accomplish. And then the second ⁓ is, ⁓ even if it does dislodge this regime, there’s no guarantee that the next one is going to be any better than this one. In fact, the most likely outcome, seems to me, ⁓ of this regime disappearing, the clerics, right? The clerics who rule the way they rule and with the ideology that they rule with. ⁓ That resulted, right, in thousands and thousands and thousands of deaths of the protesters you talked about, Jim, that ⁓ the most likely outcome is the IRGC takes over, right? They got the money. They got the guns. They got the power. They have the know-how. Now, they might cut a deal with Trump because they’re not ideologues. ⁓ They’re in it for the money. They own all these industries. They’re in it for the money. They want to sustain that. They might cut a deal with the president visa the way Delcy Rodriguez has. ⁓ Yeah, so they could do that, but maybe not to. The other thing I remind people of ⁓ is ⁓ even a democratic, a truly democratic Iran might not be Iran we like. So this desire for ⁓
Jim Lawler (20:14.957) I was going to say it sounds a lot like Finis of Weyland. ⁓
John Sipher (20:16.406) Mm. ⁓
Buckeye (20:34.315) This Iranian desire for hegemony in the Middle East, it’s what the proxies are about, it’s what the missiles are about, it’s what the nuclear program is about, right? That’s not a clerical regime thing. That’s not an Iranian thing. That is a deeply Persian thing, right? ⁓ They had one third of the world’s population under their control when it was the Persian Empire. They think they have a right to that again, just like Vladimir Putin thinks that Russia has a right to ⁓ the Russian empire. ⁓ The Shah used to talk openly about his desire for nuclear weapons someday. ⁓ And the father of the current Iranian nuclear weapons program is a guy named Rafsanjani, who was a moderate in this regime. ⁓ even a truly democratic regime
John Sipher (21:25.006) ⁓ Mm-hmm.
Buckeye (21:30.701) Iran is going to be at odds ⁓ at many times with the United States and our other allies in the region. And I guess the last point I’d make on the why not now, right, those are all why not nows. The other why not now is ⁓ the risks are enormous. ⁓ You know, one risk is that the Iranians ⁓ are ⁓ successful militarily either in Israel killing a large number of citizens or successful vis-a-vis us in sinking a warship. ⁓ Remember the Falklands War, out of nowhere, the Argentinians ⁓ had a missile that nobody knew about and they sunk a British warship, right? ⁓ Massive fallout in the UK over that. ⁓ I’m not predicting that because I don’t know if they have any special weapons, but who knows? ⁓ It’s always possible, right? The other possibility is that in a ⁓ significant war, Gulf oil infrastructure gets mixed up in the fight. ⁓ Saudi, Emirati, I don’t think anybody wants to have an oil war here, but you never know. ⁓ If the Iranians feel that this is existential to them, they might want to escalate. as high as they can go, right, which is attacking oil and trying to escalate so high that we say, my God, and we pull out. They might think that. You know, that could take oil to $250 a barrel, right? In that case, right, forget about the midterms. Forget about the midterms, right? It looks like a bloodbath to begin with. So there are massive economic risks, strategic risks, ⁓ and political risks for the president. So he’s got to weigh all this. guess he’s even doing that today, right? ⁓ But there’s an argument for ⁓ and there’s a strong argument for and a strong argument against.
John Sipher (23:20.866) Ha. ⁓
John Sipher (23:29.559) But I think we learn from our experience too that this notion that these things are easy are sort of ⁓ not true. And I think this administration, this president in particular, likes to think that he can pull off things that are easy. And he’s had a little bit of success with that. So I think it’s in his head. So there is some danger there. But let me ask you more general question based on your long experience as a very senior analyst in the CIA. ⁓ How do you see AI impacting intelligence moving forward? And what does intelligence advantage mean in AI deep, deep, I ⁓ don’t know what, deep data, big data, better collection, faster analysis world that we’re gonna be living in? How’s it gonna affect decision-making, do you think?
Buckeye (24:11.931) From an intelligence perspective, right? ⁓ That’s a great question. So I think it has a very significant use in cybersecurity, in cyber both defensively and offensively, right? ⁓ You know, the way these ⁓ cyber attacks are done both by us and by our adversaries is you ⁓ get a foothold in a network and then you got to figure out how to get from where you are to where the good stuff is.
John Sipher (24:13.592) Yeah.
Buckeye (24:41.687) And it means making a jump and then evaluating and exploring where you are and figuring out where your next jump is, right? You don’t have a map, right, of the whole network. You got to sort of figure out the map as you go. Put it that way. ⁓ That’s a time consuming process. So somebody might get a foothold in a network because of a successful hack. And it might be two months before the ⁓ offensive cyber guys figure out exactly where the good stuff is and start.
John Sipher (24:50.926) ⁓ Okay. ⁓ you ⁓
Buckeye (25:11.435) you know, their exfiltration. With AI, you can do that much faster because you can have that AI do the analysis for you. And maybe it makes some mistakes, but who cares, right? It’s just moving so much faster. ⁓ So that’s a place both offensively and ⁓ you respond to it, right, by using AI on the defense too. ⁓ So that’s one place. ⁓ You know, ⁓ I’ve seen since I left government,
John Sipher (25:16.526) There. ⁓
Buckeye (25:41.217) all sorts of both collection tools ⁓ and analytic tools that are AI driven. ⁓ And they’re incredibly impressive. You can see all sorts of interesting intelligence use cases. And you say to yourself, I wonder if the CIA has this because they absolutely should, right? ⁓ And then you learn that they don’t. And you’re like scratching your head.
John Sipher (26:1.838) ⁓ Ha ha ha ⁓ ha.
Buckeye (26:5.143) And we all know our organization, right? We absolutely love it, but not invented here, right, is a pretty strong, pretty strong character trait. ⁓ So I think, I think that’s changing. Director Radcliffe just put out new guidance on how small tech firms can get into the building, which I think is terrific. ⁓ We’ll see if that makes a difference. Other people have tried things like this. This is another attempt at that. ⁓ I think there’s room. for both collection tools and analytic tools. They’re ⁓ already experimenting with this stuff inside. So ⁓ I don’t know if it’ll affect decision making, operational decision making or analytic decision making, ⁓ because you have a little bit of time. You’re not forced by the adversary to move quickly, ⁓ except in cyber. So ⁓ I think the impact is going to be massive. ⁓ I think probably the best approach, ⁓ right, if I was in my old job and we were having a meeting about AI and intelligence, ⁓ I think the best approach is let a thousand flowers bloom. Let people at the working level experiment with it. And then let’s all compare notes, right? What worked, didn’t, ⁓ rather than trying to straight jacket the whole organization into ⁓ something, right, that might not end up working.
John Sipher (27:26.412) Yeah, we see, for example, like you’ve seen groups like Bellingcat and these other guys that do collection piece of this, not the Atlanta. Well, I guess that’s an analytical in a sense, too. And you see how, you know, those kind of things would be beneficial inside the building. And yeah, the mindset has to change a little bit ⁓ to bring those in. So we’ll see.
Buckeye (27:43.735) Yeah. But the other thing that I tell companies, right, companies will come in with ⁓ these great analytic tools and it sits on top of open source data. And guys, what I say to them is, guys, that’s great. But when you take it to CIA, they’re going to want it to sit on top of ⁓ all of the data, both the open source data ⁓ and all of our classified holdings, right? ⁓ The open source data is great, but we’ve got so much more. So let’s use it, right? And the company’s got to get in that mindset that they got to figure out a way how to integrate all of that special data, right? And we as an intelligence agency have to figure out a way because so much stuff is compartmented now, right? ⁓ I it was always compartmented, right? But so much stuff is compartmented now that ⁓ you run the risk that if not all the data is there and you miss something,
John Sipher (28:30.446) in them.
Buckeye (28:42.883) and you find out that in some compartments, this was George Tennant’s big worry after 9-11, right? That somewhere in our building was gonna be the next attack and we’re gonna miss it because it’s compartmented. So they gotta figure that out too.
Jim Lawler (28:56.911) You know, that’s interesting you say that Michael’s ⁓ professor from Stanford in a retired army general ⁓ asked me how AI would affect human recruitment, recruitment of foreign spies. And I said exactly what you did. I said, if you could combine a, an AI tool to scoop up all the overt information and all the covert information about particular people that we wanted to recruit all their financials, their medical, everything else, it would be a fabulous tool. ⁓ enabling case officers how to make the proper recruitment approach. So you’ve talked about Ukraine, we’ve talked about a little bit about Russia, what are any thoughts that you have on China?
Buckeye (29:37.693) Sure. ⁓ Like I said, I’m a little worried that we are headed toward. some sort of a deal, right, where we get a good bit of what we want on economics and Xi gets a good bit of what he wants on national security, right, like not sell weapons to Taiwan, distance ourselves a bit from Taiwan. There’s a risk there. There’s a real risk of that happening, I think. With regard to Taiwan, I say a couple of things about China. One, with regard to Taiwan, ⁓ I do not believe ⁓ that ⁓ a Chinese attack on Taiwan ⁓ is ⁓ likely in the near term. I think without a doubt, actually, think without a doubt that Xi, President Xi, sees military action against Taiwan as a last resort. It would be a massive risk for him. Imagine trying and failing. Not only would he lose his job, but the Communist Party would be out of power. This issue is so important to the Chinese public. So if he does it, he’s got to make sure that he can do it. And when he told his military to be ready by 2027, he was admitting that they weren’t ready yet. And the reason you see so much discussion about a possible blockade
Buckeye (31:16.901) is because they can’t do an invasion yet. They don’t have what they need. ⁓
Buckeye (31:25.021) ⁓ So his ⁓ goal is to build such a massive military force across the straits from Taiwan that a Taiwan president wakes up some day and a US president at the same time wakes up some day and says, ⁓ is not worth it. This is not worth it. Let’s find ⁓ a way out of this. Let’s find ⁓ a way to give China what they want here. ⁓ That’s what she wants. I don’t know if that’s possible, but that’s what he wants. Would he go to war if Taiwan declared independence ⁓ or if the US changed its one China policy? Probably, because he would have to. ⁓ But that’s where the blockade might happen. That’s why they’ve been practicing the blockade, just in case. ⁓ If the US changed its one China policy, China might grab one of those Taiwan islands that are really close to China. ⁓ That would be an easy grab. And they would say, OK, what are you going do about it? And in a blockade situation, ⁓ they would say, we’re blockading you, no weapons in, we decide what comes in and out. And if anybody wants to take the first shot, Taiwan, US, go ahead. So ⁓ I don’t think Taiwan ⁓ is ⁓ a near-term issue. I don’t think there’s any evidence that Xi has given up on his goal of coercing them back into the fold rather than forcing them. Second thing I’d say is that, look, we got a lot of problems here, right? For sure. China’s got a lot of problems too. A lot of problems. They got a massive demographic problem. ⁓ The number of workers per non-worker ⁓ is falling rapidly. That is a real economic problem. They are massively in debt. ⁓ They over-invested. There are so many buildings in Beijing, for example, that there’s nobody, ⁓ nobody in. There are so many factories that are idle because they simply over-invested. This is what Japan did that got Japan into so much trouble. They’ve got, ⁓ they also have a leadership problem. And here’s the leadership problem. China had figured out how to have an authoritarian government, which they need, right, for the Communist Party to stay in power.
Buckeye (33:51.569) but having a change in leadership every ⁓ number of years. That’s actually brilliant, right? You have a change in leadership so you get fresh ideas. Not only the leader has fresh ideas and new energy, but the people they bring with them have fresh ideas, ⁓ more creativity. But by Xi making himself leader for life, there’s a real risk of sclerosis ⁓ in Chinese policy going forward. I think you can actually see that a little bit. ⁓ And that is not in the long-term interest of China. ⁓ that’s ⁓ a downside. The other downside is that Xi became so… The other problem they have, ⁓ Xi became so fearful ⁓ of the Chinese who were getting rich because of capitalism that he shut down economic reform and actually rolled it back because he was afraid of those people. the political power that they would get by being rich. You actually saw a couple of individuals ⁓ who he focused on. ⁓ And by turning off economic reform and rolling it back, you undermine, ⁓ you undermine Chinese growth. ⁓ All of that Chinese growth we saw over the years, those really high rates of growth, wasn’t because China’s socialist communist model was a good, you know, was a great thing and a successful thing. It’s because they unleashed capitalism. It was pure capitalism that led to 400, 500 million Chinese being lifted out of poverty. And he said, can’t do that because the political consequences are too great. So they’ve got their own set of problems.
John Sipher (35:35.702) and they don’t have immigration that really can fill the demographic thing. ⁓ so, yeah. So listen, you’ve been really generous with your time. We generally try to keep these sort of at a ⁓ short rate with us. So I know you’re not doing the podcast anymore. I mean, we will, ⁓ we and our listeners will be on our lookout for your writing and the things you’re saying, but is there anything you’d like to tell us that you’re thinking about working about or family businesses you should, you could tell our listeners about?
Buckeye (35:38.521) Exactly.
Buckeye (36:0.925) ⁓ No family businesses. What I will say is ⁓ I think it’s great that you guys do this ⁓ because I think it’s… No, no. ⁓ that’s what you meant by family business. ⁓ I thought you meant other things. Yes, Middleburg Books, my wife’s bookstore, Middleburg, Virginia. It’s fantastic. She’s built a…
John Sipher (36:11.384) Wait, you’re not going to hack the bookstore? OK, all right. Good. right. Good. All right. I’m sorry. Go ahead. ⁓ It is good. Yeah, yeah, yeah. ⁓
Jim Lawler (36:16.909) It’s a good bookstore. ⁓
John Sipher (36:25.742) There you go.
Buckeye (36:28.613) Incredible. I have no responsibility in this. I carry boxes when necessary. ⁓ She built something really special. Thank you. But the last thing I wanted to say is, ⁓ you ⁓ spend any time ⁓ at CIA, you know that the vast majority of people there ⁓ are amazing Americans who are working really hard for the security of their country. And that That’s you too, right? And they see that. I listen to your podcast, right? They see that every week. ⁓ I think it’s really important that you do this. And ⁓ to those people who think we shouldn’t be talking publicly, ⁓
Jim Lawler (37:8.101) ⁓ Thank you, for those kind words. And thank you especially for this very interesting discussion for joining us today. So if you like what you heard on today’s show, please subscribe to the Steady State Sentinel wherever you get your podcasts and give us a five star review on Google if possible. These subscriptions and the five star reviews help us get the important content to the widest audience possible. The Steady State Sentinel is for you, our listeners. and we want to hear from you. So please stay informed, stay engaged, and join us next week for another episode of the Steady State Sentinel. For the Steady State Sentinel, I’m Jim Lawler, still standing watch.
John Sipher (37:53.678) All right, thanks Michael.
Buckeye (37:54.287) That was great guys
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
The Steady State Sentinel is produced by The Steady State, a community of former national security professionals who spent their careers safeguarding the United States at home and abroad. Today, we continue that mission by staying true to our oaths to defend the Constitution, uphold democracy, and protect national security. Each episode features expert hosts in conversation with accomplished guests whose experience sheds light on the crises and challenges facing the nation.
https://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.png00admin12https://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.pngadmin122026-03-02 23:59:002026-03-02 13:00:54Transcript – Might Makes Right? Michael Morell on U.S. Power, Allies, and Adversaries – The Steady State Sentinel Episode 15
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
https://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.png00sienahttps://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.pngsiena2026-03-02 15:03:202026-03-02 15:03:20The Steady State Sentinel – “Might Makes Right” with Former CIA Deputy and Acting Director, Michael Morrell – Tomorrow, March 3 (Video)
On February 27, 1933, the Reichstag, home of the German parliament in Berlin, burned to the ground following an arson attack. Using the fire as a pretext, Hitler, then the German Chancellor, induced the German president to issue the Reichstag Fire Decree, suspending civil liberties. The suspensions led to mass arrests of political opponents and allowed Hitler to consolidate power and dismantle democratic institutions. They remained in effect during the entirety of the Nazi reign. How susceptible is the United States to its own Reichstag moment?
What is certain is that the current administration of President Trump has increasingly shown a willingness to threaten the civil liberties of American citizens and non-citizens alike. At the same time, not since September 10, 2001, has the U.S. been as susceptible and vulnerable as it is today to an international terrorist attack on domestic soil following the deliberate choice of the President to disregard Constitutional constraints and ignite a war in the Middle East.
The same institutions which were created and/or enhanced post-9/11 to protect America and its citizens from international terrorism, notably the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security (DHS) as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), have either been decimated and demoralized by staff firings or redirected to domestic initiatives, to include mass arrests of non-criminal undocumented immigrants, resulting in overall reduced operational capacity. The current administration has codified this reprioritization and redirection of resources intended to counter international terrorism, to include DHS and FBI assets (such as Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or JTTFs), through the issuance of National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-7, Countering Domestic Terrorism and Organized Political Violence.
Because both the risk of an international terrorist attack has increased and our ability to prevent such attacks has diminished, the likelihood of the U.S. being targeted is now at its greatest since 9/11. Should such an attack occur, it can create a pretext for a president seeking to expand his authority, just as the Reichstag fire in 1933 Germany was used as a pretext for authoritarian measures.
It takes a strong commitment to democratic principles and civil liberties for all on the part of national leadership to resist taking advantage of such a pretext. Do we have such leadership in our nation today, or has the U.S. been set up for our own Reichstag moment – and if so, has it been deliberate?
J. William Leonard is the Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security & Information Operations), Former Director, Information Security Oversight Office and Former Chief Operating Officer, National Endowment for Democracy. He is a member of The Steady State.
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
https://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.png00sienahttps://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.pngsiena2026-03-02 12:04:472026-03-02 12:04:47Has the U.S. Been Set up for a Reichstag Moment?
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
It is difficult to understand why Donald Trump and his inner circle decided to go to war with Iran. Ordinarily, when the United States contemplates war, there is a process. The Constitution assigns the power to declare war to Congress. Over time, that process has been, in practice, largely replaced by other means to make Congress a part of the initiation of hostilities. But the underlying principle has endured: prolonged or large-scale war requires the voice and counsel of the people’s representatives. War is not meant to be the continuing decision of one person. If a president believes hostilities must be sustained, he is expected to seek authorization and funding from Congress, and it should reflect deliberation, debate, and, ultimately, the informed consent of the governed.
That process does more than allocate power. It provides an explanation. Congressional hearings, unclassified briefings, public statements, and debate all help citizens understand why American blood and treasure should be expended abroad. Even in controversial conflicts, there has usually been a discernible rationale. We may disagree with it. We may later conclude it was flawed. But it has been articulated and defended within a recognizable constitutional framework, which Congress formally or functionally engaged in the decision to initiate or continue hostilities.
Even if the process has been imperfect, Americans have historically been able to rely on something more basic: a presumption that the President acts out of patriotism, guided by experienced professionals, and exercising reasoned judgment. That presumption has extended across party lines. Citizens have trusted that before ordering missiles launched or troops deployed, the President has weighed the evidence, consulted intelligence professionals, listened to military leadership, and reflected on the national interest.
None of that clarity exists here. We are told we are now at war with Iran only after learning that our own government has carried out what appears to have been an unprovoked attack on that sovereign country. There was no meaningful congressional debate. There was, and has been, no intelligible public explanation. There was no visible interagency process that Americans could point to and say: this is how such a grave decision was made.
In place of deliberation, we have received fragments—largely delivered through social media. The explanations offered have been thin and inconsistent and include: an (unidentified) imminent Iranian threat to the US and to U.S. forces and interests abroad; the need to protect American troops and citizens in Iran; even, astonishingly, allegations that Iran “stole” the election for Joe Biden. These rationales do not make sense; they are ketchup thrown at the wall to see if it sticks. They are asserted, not demonstrated. There are, of course, genuine threats to American forces and interests in the region. But the leap from those ongoing dangers to a sudden, large-scale assault on Iran, and especially to the allegation that Iran “stole” the election for Joe Biden, lacks the evidentiary foundation and strategic clarity that one would expect before initiating hostilities against a regional power with significant asymmetric capabilities. And they have the sharp odor of lies.
If the conventional explanations do not fully explain or fail to explain the decision to go to war, then we must ask whether there is another, more obvious answer—one drawn not from constitutional democracies, but from the playbooks of authoritarian leaders: When a ruler needs to tighten his grip on power, he starts a war.
History is replete with examples. External conflict consolidates internal authority. It shifts attention away from domestic divisions. It enables emergency powers. It justifies secrecy, surveillance, and suppression in the name of national security. It reframes dissent as disloyalty. And it creates a climate in which elections, oversight, and civil liberties are portrayed as inconvenient luxuries rather than constitutional necessities.
For Donald Trump, it is increasingly clear that the central adversary is not Iran, or China, and certainly not Russia. It is the American voter—particularly voters who oppose him. He has called for “regime change” in Iran, but his real interest may be in avoiding regime change here in America.
In recent weeks, he has openly mused about the possibility that there may not be a midterm election, about the need for him to control those elections, about the desirability of a third term, and even about the idea that we “don’t need elections anymore.” These are not slips of the tongue. They are themes.
Until now, he has attempted to justify extraordinary measures by invoking domestic unrest: “leftist terrorists,” a vast Antifa network, a country supposedly teetering on the brink of insurrection. But those claims have grown increasingly untenable as Americans learn more about what actually occurred in places like Minneapolis and Los Angeles. The narrative of nationwide chaos has not held.
A foreign war against a country with a history of and capability for committing significant terrorist attacks, by contrast, is a far more sustainable justification. Iran is not a phantom menace. It is a longstanding adversary with real capabilities and a documented history of supporting proxy groups such as Hezbollah. The threat of terrorism—whether directly conducted by Iran or carried out by its global network of proxies—is real. That reality gives fear credibility.. It provides a plausible basis for emergency declarations. It allows the executive branch to invoke extraordinary authorities that would otherwise meet resistance.
This is precisely what an aspiring autocrat requires: an external enemy that is not fabricated out of whole cloth, but is real, and the danger of that enemy can be internalized, amplified, and instrumentalized. The existence of a genuine threat makes it easier to normalize expanded surveillance, militarized policing, restrictions on protest, and the marginalization of political opposition. Under the banner of wartime necessity, measures that would once have been shocking can become routine. Dictators need enemies. Sometimes they invent them. But when invention ceases to persuade, autocrats create circumstances in which the enemy seems undeniable. A long, bloody conflict with Iran would achieve what exaggerated claims of domestic unrest could not: a sustained atmosphere of emergency.
To be clear, this is not to deny that Iran poses a threat to U.S. interests or that legitimate disputes exist. Nor is it to minimize the real dangers that could flow from escalation. It is precisely because those dangers are real that the decision to go to war must be subjected to the highest level of scrutiny and constitutional discipline. But this, Trump’s decision, was not explained, coordinated, or authorized; Trump decided and then told the country that we were invading. We are at war.
If this war proceeds without additional scrutiny—if it serves to entrench executive power, sideline Congress, and condition the public to accept indefinite emergency rule—then it will not be merely a war against Iran. It will be something far more troubling.
Donald Trump may frame this as a necessary confrontation with a foreign adversary. He will undoubtedly claim it as “his” war. But if the true effect is to weaken elections, concentrate power, and suppress dissent, then the ultimate target is not Tehran. It is the American people.
Steven A. Cash served as a prosecutor in the Manhattan District Attorney’s office before joining the CIA in 1994 as Assistant General counsel and subsequently serving as an intelligence officer in the Directorate of Operations. In 2001 he joined the Senate Select committee on Intelligence as Counsel and designee-staffer to Senator Diane Feinstein). He later served as a senior staffer in the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security and the Department of Energy. In the private sector he has advised on national security, counterintelligence, and technology policy and served on the Biological Sciences Experts Group under the Director of National Intelligence. Mr. Cash is currently the Executive Director of The Steady State.
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
https://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.png00sienahttps://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.pngsiena2026-03-01 18:08:372026-03-01 18:08:37Regime Change Abroad to Avoid Regime Change at Home
February 28, 2026 – The reported U.S. attack on Iran marks one of the most consequential national security decisions in recent years. It demands sober scrutiny — not reflexive celebration, not partisan instinct, but constitutional seriousness.
At the outset, we state clearly our respect for and support of the men and women who serve this nation in uniform, in our intelligence services, and in our diplomatic corps. They execute lawful orders, often at personal risk, and with professionalism that reflects the highest traditions of public service. Our concerns are not directed at those who serve, but at the process and judgment that place them in harm’s way. Their courage and commitment deserve clarity of mission, constitutional legitimacy, and strategic discipline.
Iran is not a fictional adversary. For decades, the regime in Tehran has supported proxy violence, destabilized the region, and pursued capabilities that threaten U.S. interests and allies. There are Americans who will view military action as long overdue. There are others who fear escalation, retaliation, and regional war. Both reactions are understandable.
What is not understandable — and not acceptable — is the apparent absence of constitutional process.
The Constitution vests in Congress the power to declare war. That allocation is not ceremonial. It is designed to prevent unilateral executive escalation, to require deliberation, and to ensure that when American lives are put at risk, the people’s representatives have been fully engaged. Reporting indicates that key congressional leaders were informed as operations were underway. That is notification, not authorization.
War, even when tactically justified, cannot be strategically sound if it bypasses constitutional guardrails.
Equally concerning is the opacity surrounding the intelligence basis for this decision. The United States maintains a $100+ billion intelligence enterprise for one reason: to provide policymakers with independent, objective assessments — particularly in moments of crisis. That system works only if analytic integrity is protected.
This administration has repeatedly disparaged, sidelined, and dismissed intelligence professionals when their conclusions conflicted with presidential narratives. The firing of senior intelligence officials following preliminary assessments that diverged from White House claims has sent a chilling signal throughout the system. In that environment, the question is not merely what intelligence was presented — but whether it was able to be presented candidly at all.
The central issue of the status and imminence of Iran’s nuclear capability has been publicly characterized in inconsistent ways over the past year. Americans deserve clarity. They deserve to know whether this action was driven by demonstrable necessity, or by policy preference.
The strategic implications are equally profound. Reporting suggests that the strikes extended beyond facilities to leadership targets, raising the specter of regime change. Regime change is not a limited objective. It carries with it the prospect of prolonged military engagement, regional destabilization, and unpredictable escalation. Such a course requires robust debate, coalition-building, and congressional endorsement. None of that appears to have preceded the action.
The United States is capable of using force responsibly. It has done so in the past. But responsible use of force depends on process: structured interagency deliberation, diversified counsel from experienced professionals, and serious evaluation of second- and third-order consequences. The visible pattern of this administration – impulsive action, concentration of authority, marginalization of dissenting views – undermines confidence that such discipline was applied here.
There is an additional dimension that cannot be ignored.
War consolidates executive power. It expands emergency authorities. It narrows political space. At a time when the President has openly questioned the necessity of elections, suggested personal control over their administration, and mused about extended tenure in office, the convergence of war and executive centralization should concern every American — regardless of party.
Iran presents real threats. The danger of retaliation, including through proxy networks such as Hizballah, is genuine. But real threats do not relieve us of constitutional obligations. They heighten them.
Democracies wage war differently than autocracies. They do so transparently, lawfully, and with institutional balance. They respect the analytic independence of their intelligence services. They engage Congress meaningfully. They treat the public as a partner in understanding risk; not as an audience for after-the-fact rationalizations.
If the United States is to confront Iran militarily, it must do so within the framework of law and constitutional fidelity. The defense of the nation abroad must not come at the expense of the democracy we seek to defend at home.
The Steady State calls upon Congress to assert its constitutional role immediately; upon intelligence professionals to continue to uphold analytic integrity; and upon the American people to insist that national security decisions of this magnitude meet the highest standards of process, transparency, and democratic accountability.
Our strength lies not only in our military capabilities, but in our democratic values enshrined in the constitution and in the institutions that uphold them. Neither must become collateral damage.
Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
https://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.png00sienahttps://thesteadystate.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2025.12.20-NEW-LOGO-1-150.pngsiena2026-02-28 21:06:322026-02-28 21:06:32THE STEADY STATE Statement on U.S. Attack of Iran
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Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.
