The World Just Became Less Secure: America’s Emergency Preparedness Is Not Ready for What Comes Next

FIFA World Cup Match Schedule

For more than four decades, the United States has designated the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. Over that time, Iran has conducted major terrorist attacks, attempted many more (including attempts using weapons of mass destruction), and steadily expanded its proxy network, as well as its broad toolkit of asymmetric capabilities to include: cyber operations, drones, and disinformation campaigns designed to threaten Western interests.

The February 28 attack on Iran may have degraded some of Iran’s capabilities while increasing incentives for retaliation against Western assets, potentially posing a direct threat to the Homeland. President Trump himself admitted that Americans should be worried about retaliatory attacks in the Homeland, with a disheartening “I guess”. This leadership and information gap leaves our frontline agencies guessing rather than guarding.

Given all the disparate tools that Iran and Iranian allies have developed, and their urgent interest in inflicting harm and sowing chaos through asymmetric warfare, the possibility of retaliation against the United States, including within the Homeland, cannot be dismissed. as evidenced by the recent unverified FBI report that Iran may be targeting California with drones.

How prepared is the United States to respond if our adversaries escalate beyond conventional attacks and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons? The answer is troubling. The United States is less prepared for such an attack today than it was just a year ago.

In 2011, a decade after the 9/11 attacks, the White House issued Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD8) to strengthen the security and resilience of the U.S. through systemic preparation. PPD8 matured the emergency preparedness approach by breaking down pre-9/11 information silos beyond terrorism; expanding training, outreach, funding, and research; and significantly increasing cross-pollination between federal agencies and state and local law enforcement, public safety, and public health organizations. Today, this integrated system is being dismantled through a policy of institutional deconstruction and neglect.

Intelligence that is used to learn about potential attacks is not effectively reaching those who are most at risk. Reports that the White House stopped a National Threat Advisory System alert related to Iranian network threats demonstrate a critical failure of transparency. This builds on cuts to DHS Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), which began limiting state and local intelligence sharing last year. While I&A has never fully lived up to its vision, suppressing threat warnings and cutting cooperation does not reduce the threats or risks; it only blinds the public and first responders to dangers they need to anticipate.

Regarding the important task of preparing for a CBRN attack, the planning, preparation, and detection portion of that mission is being hollowed out. The DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) served as the single point of expertise within DHS for matters pertaining to WMD and led the development of counter-WMD and CBRN strategies and policies (in coordination with federal, state, and local partners). CWMD closely supported those state and local first responders on the front lines of CBRN response, developing a deep, sustained relationship with these partners through initiatives to identify radiological and nuclear threats in major cities (Securing the Cities) and to detect an aerosolized bioterrorism attack (BioWatch).

In the past year, due to DHS Secretary Noem’s requirement that all disbursements over $100,000 had to be reviewed by the DHS Front Office, the BioWatch disbursement of routine, Congressionally-appropriated funds to the BioWatch jurisdictions was suspended and delayed multiple times, impacting the federally-funded, locally managed program. Reportedly, several BioWatch jurisdictions are considering voluntarily withdrawing from the BioWatch program because they cannot rely on the funding to manage their own teams. This administrative snafu has made the U.S. more vulnerable. We will be less aware of aerosolized bioterrorism attacks, exactly at the time those attacks could become more likely.

Not content with just delaying or restricting funds, the Trump Administration recommended devolving CWMD, scattering its expert elements throughout the DHS enterprise. By decentralizing the CWMD expertise, funding, preparation, and training for these low-probability, high-impact threats will once again fall to the bottom of the priority list, continuing to distract and demoralize a workforce depleted from retirements and management-directed reassignments.

In the event of an attack, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the linchpin of emergency response. The FEMA Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) provides preparedness training programs (including CBRN) to the nation’s emergency response providers through grants and other federal funds. In the calendar year 2025, CDP was closed for several months due to DOGE, leading to a one-third drop in trained students. It is now closed again due to a DHS–FEMA funding gap. FEMA’s own fate is not certain, with the cancellation of the FEMA Review Council report on FEMA’s future, and inconsistent opinions within the Trump Administration and Congress on this issue.

These disruptions have created significant uncertainty for state and local officials in frontline emergency response. Their concerns are especially acute given the plethora of large public events scheduled in the United States in the near future, including the upcoming World Cup and the nation’s 250^th anniversary. State and local officials are always the first line of defense in any crisis, and they need to have the tools and capabilities to respond effectively.

DHS has always worked best when it works together with state and local partners. If Iran attacks the United States, it won’t be attacking the “Homeland,” it will be Boston, Detroit, Indianapolis, or a city near you. Those responding first will be from the state and local emergency response teams, which this administration has left to fend for themselves. Based on Presidential budgets, DOGE, and shifting Administration philosophy on FEMA, the entire architecture of the planning and prevention for a high-impact retaliatory attack is atrophying at the exact moment international volatility is ascending. To best protect the American public during this heightened risk environment, the administration must change course and equip state and local partners with the intelligence, detection capabilities, response training, and expertise necessary to defend against CBRN threats.

Mary Ellen Callahan served as a senior political appointee in the Department of Homeland Security for eight years, most recently as the Assistant Secretary for the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office from 2023-2025. In 2025, she was awarded the Order of the Dragon, Legionnaire Award by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps Regimental Association. She is a member of The Steady State

Founded in 2016, The Steady State is a nonprofit 501(c)(4) organization of more than 390 former senior national security professionals. Our membership includes former officials from the CIA, FBI, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security. Drawing on deep expertise across national security disciplines, including intelligence, diplomacy, military affairs, and law, we advocate for constitutional democracy, the rule of law, and the preservation of America’s national security institutions.